HIKMA SUMMIT
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 

FIRST OFF…

Iraq’s 2005 Constitution states that the country is a parliamentary democracy, where the parliament takes the name of Council of Representatives and has a total of 329 members representing the 19 provinces of Iraq. The parliament then nominates the president, who then nominates the prime minister from the largest bloc/coalition in parliament.
Despite the efforts to move away from sectarian governmental dynamics which have dominated the country from day zero, the prime minister is from the Shia community, the president is Kurdish, and the Council of Representatives’ speaker is a Sunni. This division was supposed to assure equal representation for all Iraqis.

These elections take place during a time of significant change in neighbouring countries and a relative tranquillity in Iraq: On 8th December 2024 the Assad’s regime fell in Syria, sparking preoccupations among the nation for possible instabilities and violence spillovers which in turn pushed for internal stabilisation policies. At the same time, a weakened Iran has forced Iraqi politicians to reconsider their relationship with Tehran, especially after Trump’s re-election. Making this the perfect moment to become more independent from Iran’s interference.

Now, we see 3 major coalitions running: the Shia-led bloc (Shia Coordination Framework), which sees the current PM’s (Al-Sudani) Reconstruction and Development coalition, Al Maliki’s State of Law coalition and Al Ameri’s Badr Organisation just to name a few; The Sunni-led bloc sees the Taqaddum Party, Al-Siyada Party and the Azm Alliance. Finally, the Kurdish-led bloc sees the KDP, PUK and New Generation Movement.

Voter turnout has fallen sharply over the past two decades: from 80% in 2005 to just over 40% in 2021. Statistics show that this number is destined to potentially drop to a 25% in 2025, especially given the fact that only about 70% of the population possesses a biometric voter card, excluding about 9 million eligible Iraqis from voting. There is also another factor that might significantly alter elections: the Shia leader Muqtada Al-Sadr’s said his Sadrist movement would boycott these elections as well (it happened before in the 2021 elections), condemning the Shia Coordination Framework of working against their own interests.
So, even among people who do possess the card, only half expressed clear interest in voting.
Yet, beyond these alliances and politics dynamics hides a complete detachment between the people of Iraq and the political class.

THE ABSENT LANGUAGE OF REFORM

Low turnout is a direct consequence of two decades of perceived unresponsiveness, lack of representation and corruption: challenges of 20 years ago pervade society to this day.
In 2022, just like in 2018, 93% of Iraqis believed corruption to be deeply rooted in national institutions and that very little was done to combat this.

Even public services are looked down upon, with the highest satisfaction found at 31% of Iraqis for trash collection. Iraq’s citizens would love to see more money allocated to education and healthcare, though the data differs between people in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the Government of Iraq (GOI).
After Lebanon, Iraq sees the highest number of daily electricity outages with 77% of Iraqis stating they experience them every day. Water outages, on the other hand, affect 33% of Iraqis daily, coming second only to 50% of Algerians.
Food insecurity is also a pressing problem for about 57% of the population, meaning 57% of people state they run out of food before they have the money to buy more.

Iraqis are united when it comes to how they think their government should tackle economic problems, which is by creating new jobs, preferably in the public sector. However, the public sector is way more challenging to get into if you don’t have wasta (واسطة)* or connections. Where wasta is the first sign of corruption.

These struggles hit people in Iraq regardless of sect, and with the 2015 protest opening the door, these elections could once again underline the shift from identity-politics to issue-politics.

However, Iraqis have grown particularly disillusioned and distrustful of politics, seen as a harbour of corruption and stagnancy. Reforms and solutions usually come during political campaigns to gain support, but they aren’t thought to be long term plans and immediately after elections efforts are dropped. An example is Taqaddum’s candidate Raad al-Dulaimi, who launched a campaign to extend drinking water networks to underserved and Sunni communities north of Baghdad.
Buying votes also lives through a black market of biometric voter cards: voters receive half the money when they receive the card, and the other half on the day of the election. That is, of course, if you respected the prearranged choice of vote.
Therefore, most of the population won’t vote, and those who will, will probably do so following material interests and patronage networks.
Sadr’s boycott will also play in the turnout, whether as efficiently as in 2021 or not, underlining the ever present (though declining) Iranian influence on the country.
What’s worse is that low turnout might benefit small parties which do not represent the majority of the population, allowing the creation of a Government which is not reflective of the national will.

ARE THERE NONE SO DEAF AS THOSE WHO WILL NOT HEAR?

After 2003, Iraq’s system was built to prevent a fall into a new dictatorship, to foster pluralism and stability. However, the system proved to be inefficient, swapping dictatorship with a pervading corruption which hides behind the mask of democracy. Every stage of government formation is held behind closed doors, which allows to put people in power not because of competence, but because of political interests.
Whereas Al-Sudani’s party is likely to stay where it is and the SCF too, trust in institutions is expected to drop even more.

What Iraq needs are concrete reforms, clear and transparent rules on the allocation of governmental positions and a structural change within the elites.
Moreover, these reforms wouldn’t be just political, but existential: Iraq is now facing dire consequences of climate change which impact public health and food safety altogether, with significant consequences on the economy, too.
If there is anything that the 2015 protests in Iraq taught us, is that Iraqis are now closer to a national identity rather than a sectarian one. With close neighbours stirring the pot, the population is yearning for stability. Time will tell how this sentiment will be expressed and if it will fall on deaf ears, bringing about significant change in the region.

*Wasta would be translated to “clout”: “Getting something not because you deserve it or are entitled to it or have earnt it, but because you have connections. Wasta though is something you acquire over time; you have to be somebody to have wasta.” (Danahar, P. The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring. A&C Black.)

Sources:

https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/voter-turnout-will-define-iraqs-2025-election/

https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88294/1/Faleh_Iraqi%20Protest%20Movement_Published_English.pdf

https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/4569087

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraqs-search-for-security-and-sovereignty-after-assads-collapse/

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/19/in-iraq-will-muqtada-al-sadrs-endgame-of-power-work

https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVII_Iraq_Country_Report-ENG.pdf