HIKMA SUMMIT
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 

LET’S GO BACK TO THE BASICS

On 17 December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a young street vendor in Sidi Bouzid, set himself on fire to protest police harassment and the authoritarianism of President Ben Ali. He died on 4 January 2011. His act ignited the uprisings that are known as the “Arab Spring”, or more precisely, the “Arab Republics’ Spring,” since monarchies faced demands for reform rather than drastic  regime change.

Between 2011 and 2015, Tunisia undertook one of the most successful constitution-making processes in modern history, a genuinely bottom-up endeavour. Tunisians democratically elected their National Constituent Assembly, the process was transparent, political parties (including the winning moderate Islamist party Ennahda) compromised, and international legitimacy was sought through advisory opinions from bodies such as the Venice Commission.

This perfect grasp of the “constituent moment,” to borrow Ackerman’s terminology, produced a consensual constitution that embodied social rights, democratic principles, and separation of powers. For nearly a decade, Tunisia stood out as a regional exception: Freedom House classified it as “Free” until 2021, which is an extraordinary achievement compared to the fate of other Arab Spring countries.

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

It is difficult to imagine how such a constitutional success could be dismantled within two years of President Kaïs Saïed’s 2019 election.
Saïed, a constitutional law professor with an outsider, anti-establishment appeal, rose to power by channeling widespread public frustration. Tunisians, exhausted by corruption, economic hardship, and political stagnation, found his populist message persuasive.
Saïed quickly fulfilled the classic populist profile: railing against “elites,” denouncing foreign interference, portraying the judiciary as corrupt, and presenting himself as the sole savior capable of restoring Tunisia’s lost dignity.
So it is of no surprise that in July 2021, Kaïs Saïed used article 80 of the Constitution to declare the state of exception. Just two months later, he announced the will to start the process for a new constitution.

However, unlike the more participatory process used between 2011 and 2014, the drafting of the 2022 Constitution was much more similar to Morocco’s approach in 2011, essentially a top-down process in which the authorities granted the new constitutional text rather than emerging from broad public involvement: the so-called “octroyée constitution”.

Moreover, some provisions were deemed to be dangerously open “to pave the way for a dictatorial regime”.

At this point the authoritarian shift was already undeniable: in 2021 Saïed froze parliament, fired the prime minister and stripped ministers of their immunity.
In 2022 the High Council of the Judiciary, the organ that appoints the judges, was dismantled and replaced with one of Saïed’s liking where out of 21 members, 9 would be appointed by him. This consolidated the democratic backsliding and the weaponisation of the judiciary. With a frozen parliament and a technically emptied judiciary, the power can only be concentrated in Saïed’s hands.

THE REPRESSION INTENSIFIES

From early 2023 onward, repression intensified. Individuals deemed as political threats (opponents, activists, journalists, and lawyers) were imprisoned without due process. Freedom of expression was curtailed, and political activities criminalized. Arbitrary detention became the main instrument to silence dissent, with accusations typically framed around “undermining external state security,” “conspiracy against state security,” or “attempting to alter the nature of the state.”
These are the same grounds of accusation used by a Tunis prosecutor on the 2nd May 2024 against 40 defendants, going as far as stating that lawyers, political opponents and activists were plotting to overthrow Saïed or even kill him.
Some of the defendants were charged with accusations under Tunisia’s penal code and others were charged under the 2015 Counterterrorism Law; the latter itself being considered as a danger to human rights.
The Trial began on the 4 of March 2025, but it was far from being fair.

The latest reprisal on December 4th against political opposition figures and activists involves Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison for “plotting against the State”. However, Chebbi is not the only one involved: Ayachi Hammami, a human rights activist, and Chaima Issa were also arrested and sentenced to five and twenty years respectively.
Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty, declared their concern regarding these arrests, whilethe European Parliament also urged Tunisia to release the detainees and get back on the track of freedom of expression and the rule of law.
Chebbi’s political coalition, the National Salvation Front, declared these sham trials as a crime against the very principle of justice and Tunisia’s reputation.

ANOTHER DIGNITY REVOLUTION

Tunisia is now a textbook case of democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation. Its trajectory mirrors the illiberal turns seen in Poland and Hungary, though Tunisia’s institutions were younger and therefore more vulnerable.
Yet Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution remains a powerful symbol: the product of popular struggle, painstaking negotiation, and a genuine participatory vision of democracy. It embodied social and democratic rights that Tunisians fought hard to secure.

Whether the country can reclaim that constitutional legacy remains an open question, but history shows that once democratic erosion begins, rebuilding is far harder than resisting it in the first place.