Connectivity as the new geopolitical battleground
Can it be a solution to the ongoing crisis in the Gulf?

DI VALENTINA ANGIOLANI

1/04/2026

The global landscape is undergoing a profound transformation and is increasingly shaped by the search for more resilient and efficient supply chains. The COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the fragmentation of the international system have exposed the fragility of supply chains optimized for efficiency but not designed to withstand crises. Recent crises have shown that building fast and cheap trade routes is not enough, because they must also be robust, meaning able to withstand wars, pandemics, and instability. Having alternative routes and avoiding dependence on a single supplier have become strategic priorities for all major powers, thus developing a new side of international cooperation.

Today, infrastructure is not just an economic tool for development: ports, railways, submarine cables, and pipelines have become the arteries of geopolitical influence. Those who build infrastructure set the rules on data flows, tariffs, technical standards, and diplomatic alignments.

Connectivity emerged as one of the main arenas of the world's great powers' competition.

Infrastructure creates dependencies: when a country’s port is financed or managed by a foreign power, that power gains leverage; when a country’s digital backbone depends on a single provider, questions of data sovereignty arise. When a nation’s energy imports rely on a single corridor, its foreign policy choices become constrained.

Several major initiatives now define this competition: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the EU’s Global Gateway, the U.S.-led Blue Dot Network, and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

What is IMEC?

The IMEC was launched at the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023 and signed by India, the US, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, and the EU. It is not just a logistical project, but a broader strategic architecture aimed at strengthening economic interdependence among its signatories. Its stated objective is to create an integrated corridor linking India to Europe through the Gulf, combining rail networks, maritime routes, energy infrastructure, and fiber-optic cables. The recent EU–India free trade agreement of January 2026 further reinforces the economic logic of the corridor by reducing tariff barriers along the entire axis.

By further delving into its structure, IMEC can be approached through three main pillars, being transport, energy and digitalisation. The transport pillar aims to reduce shipping times between India and Europe by up to 40%, providing strategic redundancy to the Suez Canal. Furthermore, Mediterranean ports (Trieste, Genoa, Marseille-Fos, and Piraeus) are identified as entry nodes into the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), the system of roads, railways, ports, airports, and inland waterways designated by the EU as strategic for connecting member states. Then, the energy pillar includes the transport of hydrocarbons, green hydrogen, electricity, and critical materials for the energy transition. Lastly, the digital pillar focuses on developing new submarine cables and data infrastructure.

The perspectives of the countries involved

The international powers involved in the project have built a diverse posture towards the implementation of IMEC, strongly defending their strategic interests.

For India, the corridor provides access to Western markets while bypassing Pakistan and reducing dependence on vulnerable routes; New Delhi has positioned itself as a central pillar of the project, supported by a National Master Plan for Multimodal Connectivity. At the same time, however, India hedges its strategy by signing in 2024 a ten-year agreement to develop Iran’s Chabahar port, demonstrating that IMEC is only one of several connectivity tools that New Delhi is pursuing simultaneously.

For Gulf countries, instead, the corridor aligns with broader economic diversification ambitions.

Saudi Arabia integrates it into its Vision 2030, while the revival of the Gulf Railway Project, a 2,100 km rail network connecting the GCC countries, expected by 2030, will form the land backbone of IMEC. The United Arab Emirates enters the project from a position of already consolidated logistical strength, aiming to become the Gulf’s primary gateway to India. Despite converging interests, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi compete for regional primacy, and managing this rivalry will be crucial to the corridor’s success.

Among non-signatories, the picture is more complex.

Egypt perceives IMEC as a potential competitor to the Suez Canal, although the integration of Egyptian ports into the corridor’s Mediterranean network could transform this threat into an opportunity.

Turkey opposes the current configuration, promoting its Development Road Initiative through Iraq instead; however, in an increasingly competitive landscape of competing corridors, competitive coexistence appears more realistic than exclusive alignment.

What does it mean for the European Union?

The EU has several reasons to support IMEC.

First of all, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated efforts to diversify energy supplies: the share of Russian gas in EU imports fell to 19% in 2024, while the energy dimension of IMEC aligns with the decarbonization goals of the Green Deal. The corridor could also facilitate the transport of critical minerals, reducing dependence on Chinese supply chains.

The Global Gateway provides the institutional framework for European engagement in IMEC to mobilize up to €300 billion by 2027. Two flagship projects are already directly linked to the initiative: the EU–Africa–India digital corridor and the Euro-Asia subsea electricity interconnection.

Within Europe, competition for the western terminal of the corridor has intensified between Italy (Trieste), Greece (Piraeus), and France (Marseille): rather than fueling internal competition, IMEC would benefit from integration into the revised TEN-T network, with different ports serving complementary hinterland markets as nodes in a grid rather than rivals along a single route.

Aims and obstacles

The benefits of implementing the corridor are multiple and operate on different levels.

Economically, the corridor would connect countries representing around one quarter of global GDP and nearly two billion people. Geopolitically, it provides the United States, the EU, and India with a tool to mitigate risks associated with dependence on China without requiring full decoupling. On the energy and digital front, new infrastructure along the corridor would strengthen data sovereignty and support Europe’s green transition.

The challenges, however, are significant. IMEC can emerge as a reliable corridor only if certain conditions are met: long-term stability in the Middle East, smooth cross-border exchanges in terms of regulations and customs standards, and an institutionalized coordination mechanism among participating countries. Regional instability, from the war in Gaza to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, from tensions in the Strait of Hormuz to uncertainty surrounding Iran, complicates infrastructure planning and investor confidence.

Despite these difficulties, IMEC has not stalled. Construction of key infrastructure components began in April 2025; analysts, however, agree that the project urgently requires a permanent coordinating body and a clearer financial roadmap.

The challenge ahead is less about political will and more about coordination. IMEC is decentralised, spanning multiple sovereign states across three continents. The IMEC must navigate the interests of a dozen governments, private investors, and multilateral institutions simultaneously. The race for global connectivity is a contest over the rules of the international order. Who finances infrastructure determines who sets technical standards, who extracts resources, who controls data, and who holds leverage in future crises. Every port deal, every railway concession, and every undersea cable is also a foreign policy decision. IMEC is a test of whether a coalition of states can build something together without the command-and-control advantages that China brings to the BRI. Whether that legitimacy can be translated into concrete steel and cable will define not only trade routes but the shape of the multipolar order itself. IMEC faces major challenges related to costs, governance, financing, security, and implementation, which could prevent it from becoming a fully operational corridor.

The real challenge is not designing connectivity corridors but making them operational.

Will IMEC push geopolitical competitors to devote themselves to a broader intersectional opportunity?