HIKMA SUMMIT
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I. When the Wells Run Dry

The Social Cost of Drought

Most of the countries facing extremely high water stress – the gap between water supply and water demand for each given country – are located on the shores of the Mediterranean, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been acknowledged as the most water-stressed region in the world. According to the International Water Management Institute, it only benefits about 1% of global freshwater resources, and average annual renewable freshwater resources per capita are only one-tenth of the global mean (World Bank, 2025).

The crisis intersects with climate change, Water-Energy-Food Nexus, and governance. The water consumption in cities (8% of freshwater resources) and agriculture (70%-90%) threaten to inflate the water demand due to rising temperatures, evaporative loss of water from crops, increased irrigation requirements, and the limited presence of green areas. For instance, the Aswan High Dam in Egypt or Atatürk Dam in Türkiye, used for surface water storage, will lose more of their stored water to evaporation (Hameed & et al., 2019). Because of leakages, illegal theft and inadequate maintenance of water connections, 40% of water drinking water supply is lost in Lebanon, and 50% in Jordan (Mahmoud, 2024).

Behind statistics, an everyday tragedy lies: more than 60% of the region’s population has little or no access to potable water and develops coping strategies (World Bank, 2025). This scenario has played out in Syria, where people have utilized contaminated water from the Euphrates River without proper treatment, facing the outbreaks of waterborne illnesses as a consequence (Ferrando, 2023). UNICEF reports that children from Alhatab village in Yemen transport jerrycans to collect water from Hodeidah. Meanwhile, those grown up in Za’atari Refugee Camp in Jordan have developed the engineering of water and wastewater networks as a hobby. In June 2024, in Algeria water shortages and rationing caused public unrest, increasing pressure on the Ministry of Water to find alternative sources of water (Nebiolo, 2024). As aquifers collapse, so does trust in institutions.

From Water as a Resource to a Risk Multiplier

Among these countries, Egypt is an exception for the presence of the Nile, which has provided its population with more than 90% of water resources for thousands of years. However, due to population growth and Ethiopia’s economic expansion and competition, the Nile has become a source of conflict (Nebiolo, 2024).

In a landscape where about 80% of surface water resources and 66% of total water resources are shared between countries (Hameed et al., 2019), water scarcity corrodes cooperation within states. “Upstream powers”, that control water sources, can wield them as instruments of influence on “downstream states”, which find themselves structurally dependent, often resorting to international mediation or external alliances to secure water flows. The notion of hydro-hegemony captures this dynamic.

Since the 1970s, unilateral dam projects in the Tigris-Euphrates basin – notably Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project – have repeatedly provoked crises, such as the 1990 cutoff of the Euphrates’ flow that reduced water access to Syria and Iraq by 75% (Wilson, 2012). At the root of these water management challenges is the lack of binding and equal multilateral agreements between all the riparians (Clarke-Sather et al., 2017).

Additionally, water can be weaponized. This was the dominant military strategy of the Islamic State (IS), that contaminated water supplies of its enemies and used the Fallujah Dam on the Euphrates in Iraq to cut off supplies of cities downstream or to flood areas (Mazlum, 2018).

II. From Hydro-Conflict to Hydro-Diplomacy

The Rise of Water Diplomacy

In water conflicts, the zero-sum approach can never resolve it in a long-term perspective. The conflict will not result in a situation where two countries no longer share the river basin; water resources can be contaminated and water systems destroyed, negatively influencing all interested parties.

Yet, the nature of water multi-level governance suggests that developed regional organisations like the European Union have the potential to act both as a layer of governance and as water diplomats. Since 2000, when it adopted the Water Framework Directive, protecting all forms of water, the EU has developed into a domestic water resource policy actor, notably through river basin management (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2000).

The European Economic Social Committee (2025) goes further, framing “blue diplomacy” as an opportunity for Europe to lead by example in linking water cooperation with conflict prevention and migration management. According to a broad definition, water or blue diplomacy consists of deliberative political processes and practices of preventing, mitigating, and resolving disputes over transboundary water resources and developing joint water governance arrangements by applying foreign policy means [...] embedded in bi- and/or multilateral relations beyond the water sector and taking place at different [...] scales (Sehring & et al., 2022).

It manifests as technical governance norms, such as Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) or international water law, usually developed in fora like UN Water. Water diplomats engage in multilateral or bilateral diplomacy to promote or oppose these global water norms. In turn, regional or sub-regional diplomacy deals with specific water bodies or water governance of an area (Zareie et al., 2021).

Unlike traditional resource management, water diplomacy operates at the intersection of global security and sustainable development, and seeks to prevent disputes over shared resources as well as to transform the very logic of international relations from competition to cooperation (Krzymowski, 2021).

In view of these goals, the concept of water diplomacy is not limited to states but underlines the necessity of nonstate actors to mediate or to provide essential information via monitoring (Honkonen and Lipponen, 2018).

The EU’s Pact for the Mediterranean

This intersection is nowhere more visible than in the Mediterranean. Announced in February 2025, the EU’s Pact for the Mediterranean – One Sea, One Pact, One Future (European Commission, 2025) builds on the 2021 Agenda for the Mediterranean and seeks to deepen Euro-Mediterranean relations through a partnership among equals built around three pillars: People, Economy, and Security.

The first pillar People as a driving force for change, connections and innovation invests in education, training, and youth mobility, proposing a Heritage mechanism and a Mediterranean University Network connecting scholars and students from both shores. The pillar Stronger, more sustainable and integrated economies focuses on energy, trade, and innovation. As the water-energy nexus is characterized by a paradox – water crisis requires energy-intensive solutions, yet its energy systems often depend on significant inputs of water (Siddiqi & Diaz Anadon, 2011) – addressing water scarcity cannot be decoupled from energy policies. Finally, Security, preparedness, and migration management calls for addressing disaster preparedness and tackling the causes of migration.

However, the risk of greenwashing is real and descends from the existing asymmetries. Inequalities in technology, funding, and governance persist between North and South. While European states boast advanced water infrastructure, many southern partners struggle with outdated networks and limited data capacity, risking a new form of hydro-dependency (Falsarella, 2024).

Conclusion

Water scarcity and the governance of natural resources remain defining challenges for the Mediterranean. As transboundary waters dry, unilateral management exposes its limits, reaffirming the need for institutionalised cooperation mechanisms grounded in law, and aligning interests.

Against this background, water diplomacy gains salience. The EU’s Pact for the Mediterranean, framed around the principle of co-ownership, moves from prescriptive aid models to shared governance. Its emphasis on coalitions of the willing and on bridging the gap from policy to practice signals a deliberate shift from rhetoric to measurable outcomes aiming at human development.

Still, the success of the Pact will depend on whether its implementation can balance ambition with equitable participation from Southern partners and greater coherence across EU institutions. If these pieces align, the Pact could evolve into an operational framework, where Europe and its Southern neighbours jointly define priorities, invest in skills and clean industries, and prepare together for shared risks.

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