HIKMA SUMMIT
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Italian foreign policy has long pursued a dual purpose: Externally, the quest for international status and recognition; domestically, the management of Italy’s fragile political equilibrium. Over the decades, this balance has oscillated between Atlanticism and Europeanism, with governments seeking autonomy while remaining anchored to core international commitments. Status-seeking has thus remained a defining feature of Italy’s middle-power identity.

Since taking office, Giorgia Meloni has largely continued along this trajectory, advancing a pragmatic line that consolidates Italy’s commitments to NATO and the EU while sustaining nationalist rhetoric for her domestic audience. This dual strategy is encapsulated in her conception of the “West.” Indeed, despite her populist discourse, Meloni has emphasized transatlantic and European unity, remarking after the Trump-Zelensky meeting in February that “Any division of the West makes us all weaker.” Such statements underscore her recognition that Italy’s credibility and influence are best secured through cohesion with allies, even as her domestic rhetoric emphasizing sovereignty and national primacy.

Though initial concerns about her international posture were widespread, her government has, in practice, aligned with the long-standing traditions of center-right coalitions. Pragmatism has been the dominant trait: commitment to NATO, constructive engagement with the EU, and cautious ambition in broader autonomous initiatives such as the Mattei Plan for Africa. As Fasola and Lucarelli (2024) note, her government “avoided hostile political rhetoric, aware that the European institutions were essential for international success and Italy’s economic stability.”

The Mattei Plan illustrates both the ambition and the limitations of this approach. Intended as a flagship initiative to reshape relations with Africa, it has so far struggled to move beyond rhetorical framing, constrained by scarce resources and domestic political pressures. Without stronger European support, the initiative risks remaining symbolic, reflecting Italy’s structural constraints rather than a genuine turning point in its foreign policy.

Therefore, Meloni’s foreign policy represents continuity more than rupture. It upholds the traditional pillars of Atlanticism, Europeanism, and Mediterranean engagement, while signaling Italy’s status-seeking intent. Yet this continuity carries significant risks, particularly given Meloni’s ambiguous positioning as a “bridge” between Trump’s United States and the European Union. Such a role could undermine Italy’s ability to balance EU collective goals with US demands and limit its autonomy within the Union when European priorities diverge from those of Washington.

US-Italy Relations: A Double-Edged Sword

Reaffirming the transatlantic bond has been both a natural choice and a strategic necessity for Giorgia Meloni. It's no surprise, then, that her government has solidified the United States' role as a traditional pillar of Italian foreign policy. Demonstrating loyalty to Washington strengthens Italy’s position within NATO and the broader Western community, while also bolstering its credibility with European partners. This pragmatic calculus reflects a long-standing Italian pattern: Using transatlantic loyalty as a shortcut to international recognition and stability, even when resources and capacities are constrained.

Yet this loyalty comes at a price. Meloni’s increasing dependence on the United States, particularly her close alignment with Trump, risks reducing Italy’s room for maneuver both within the EU and on the broader international stage. Siddi (2025) describes this tension, noting that “Meloni has opted not just for alignment with transatlantic partners, but in fact subordination to US foreign policy, while being relegated to a secondary role in EU policymaking.” The risks of this approach are manifold: Italy may find its influence diminished in the US–China rivalry, face entrapment in conflicts misaligned with its interests, and risk overstretch as the government struggles to meet NATO targets while sustaining costly energy and defense commitments.

Supporters of Meloni’s strategy point to a rationale: Visible alliance burdens reduce abandonment risk, keeping the United States as Italy’s last-resort security guarantor, while greater contributions help Italy win goodwill in Washington, making it harder for the U.S. to ignore Rome’s priorities. Yet outcomes so far have been underwhelming. As Fantappié et al. (2025) caution, Meloni’s “special relationship with Trump may bring about short-term leniency on specific issues (…) however, [it] will hardly be a panacea for Italy’s structural ills; they are instead likely to undermine Italy’s long-term strategic interests, which are firmly rooted in Europe.” Bandwagoning with Washington’s disruptive agendas risks marginalizing Italy inside the EU and eroding its credibility as a middle-power.

Trump’s protectionist tariffs have already highlighted the limits of this strategy: Despite her loyalty, Italy was not exempt from economic measures – tariffs – that affected crucial export sectors. In practice, Meloni’s attempt to reassure Washington while preserving EU cohesion has left Italy diluted in both arenas. Excessive reliance on the United States risks locking Italy into subordination, undermining the very autonomy and recognition that its foreign policy has historically sought to preserve.

The Italian Role in a Fragmented Global System

Italian foreign policy under Meloni remains marked by ambiguity in defining the national interest, echoing Italy’s historical tendency toward reactive and understructured external action. Her positioning highlights a deeper dilemma: Whether to engage Washington in ways that strengthen European cohesion, or to follow her ideological affinity with Washington’s radical right, a path that risks undermining both EU unity and Italy’s credibility. Reconciling these competing impulses remains uncertain, and the outcome will determine whether Rome retains influence or slides into marginality.

Italy’s influence, as recent scholarship emphasizes, is best advanced through alignment with broader European positions and by avoiding excessive dependence on Washington. Therefore, the government’s core interests should be broken down into three priorities: Affirming Italy as a respected member of the Euro-Atlantic community, securing energy and migration stability, and maintaining recognition as a relevant international actor. These goals have largely been pursued through rapprochement with the United States, with the expectation of endorsement and protection.

Yet the risks are clear. Italy faces the danger of irrelevance through overexposure, where scarce resources are spread too thin, and the excessive personalization of foreign policy around Meloni herself weakens institutional continuity. Combined with limited fiscal space, these weaknesses underline the structural constraints that have long shaped Italian foreign policy.

At the same time, the current context offers opportunities. Compared to France and Germany, Italy enjoys relative financial and political stability – confirmed by Fitch’s 2025 upgrade of its rating to BBB+ with a stable outlook. This stability, together with Rome’s Mediterranean position and partial ideological affinity with Washington, could give Italy more room to maneuver. The Mattei Plan, despite its limitations, provides a potential pivot for projecting leadership in Africa and reinforcing Italy’s relevance in the Global South.

Looking ahead, Italy’s middle-power status will depend less on unilateral alignment with the United States than on its ability to balance Atlantic loyalty with European commitments. If Meloni can translate pragmatism into a coherent strategy – anchoring Italy in European frameworks while using its Atlantic credentials to reinforce EU cohesion – Rome could consolidate its influence. Failure to do so, however, risks a drift into subordination, forfeiting the very autonomy and recognition its foreign policy has long sought to secure.

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