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Quo vadis? The European Union faced with Trump's re-election

DI MARIKA DE PIANTE-VICIN

16/12/2024

The US elections results of the sixth of December have slammed the door open for questions and doubts that have been lingering for a long time around the EU institutions and its diplomats. To many EU personalities, Trump’s re-election came as a bit of surprise and many feel like the European Union has not done enough to prepare itself for the Tycoon’s second term in the White House. The general feeling is that, as expected, you can hide the dust under the rug only for so long before you have to vacuum.
What is the situation at the moment, what can be done and what can new faces bring to the table?

DEFENCE


Just like during his first term, Trump threatened to leave his European allies to face dangers and potential conflicts by themselves unless they actually started spending at least 2% of their GDP for NATO. On top of that, he threatened to cut American support to Ukraine.
Despite the progress made by some European NATO members when it comes to spending, the  newly elected US president still does not see it as enough. These threats come at a very difficult time for EU Economies, many of which are in a deficit and have not spent much on defence for a long time.
The consequences of low investments in the defence department were first felt almost three years ago with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Depending so much on other countries for one's own defence is not the smartest move with the current political climate (even if the countries in question are allies).
The European Union started to activate on that front at the beginning of 2024 with the  European Defence Industry Strategy. This proposal would entail a common spending program for defence equipment and some obligations when it comes to the source of the equipment. That means that according to the Strategy, in the future at least 40% of military equipment should be commonly bought by EU Members and that at least 60% of this equipment should come from within the EU. The latter point would benefit Brussels immensely since it would mean less dependence on US equipment and less uncertainty. The Strategy would treat Ukraine as a quasi-member and activate an EU Defence Innovation office in Kyiv and a well structured dialogue with NATO. This means on the one hand a more preponderant role for the EU in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict and in the other a strengthened role inside the NATO alliance. It goes without saying, member states have been reassured that no European Army is in the picture.
However, questions remain.
First of all, the elephant in the room: even if this proposal excludes a priori a European army, the EU has never been this intergovernmental since its creation.
That means that if the European Defence Community (EDC) did not pass the test back in the 1950’s, it is safe to say nothing even remotely similar will pass the test now, especially given the voting procedures and the European Union's bureaucratic mazes. Nevertheless, we have to keep into consideration some possible reactions: either the fear of an American withdrawal and a Russian attack pushes the EU members closer, hence makes them drop their mistrust in pooling their defence systems, or everyone will defend itself with sticks and stones. With Trump’s victory the former option could become prominent again, but with different paces according to the distance between a certain member state and Russia: EU countries bordering with Russia definitely feel the pressure more.
Second, the European Defence Fund (that would cover the joint procurement of equipment) is in a drought, where drought means that the shining amount of 1.5 billion is not enough to cover the expenses. And if we mix this with low European production capacities, we will realise that the aid promised to Ukraine will never arrive on time. It gives us an idea of what could happen if the U.S actually cut its support to Ukraine’s defence.
Right now it seems that, although worried, diplomats have very little room to move and that is mainly due to the way the EU operates and has operated over the decades. Inaction and impasses when the European Union had the time to really think and put in action plans aimed at ensuring a common security in this geopolitical climate brought us here.


ECONOMY


As if traditional defence was not a big enough problem, Trump’s re-election puts another trade war at the EU doorstep. The U.S president has in fact announced that he will impose heavy trade tariffs on China, but also on EU products entering the US soil, putting the EU and China on the same level. The Red Dragon might face tariffs of up to 60%, forcing it to find new outputs for its products, and guess what? The European market is a valuable alternative destination.
On the other hand the Trump Administration has threatened the European Union (or “a little China” as he liked to define it) with tariffs of up to 20-30%. Plus, if we think at the amount of European cars sold to the United States, this move might be a hard hit not only for Germany’s car industry, but for other European countries as well. The Commission recently approved a 35% tariff against Chinese electric vehicles, which most likely won’t be enough to contain the flow of all the other goods redirected from the U.S to Europe. Whether you look left or right, stormy weather seems to be ahead.
However, contrary to what happened in 2018, this time the European Union claims it won’t be taken by surprise, and has prepared its very own “Trump Task Force” to enact strong countermeasures in case Trump wants to hit Europe with unbearable tariffs. The idea is to hit so hard that Trump will be forced to negotiate or contain his tariffs, but if this plan fails the outcome would be an endless tit-for-tat. It is yet to see if this plan will actually work, but Brussels seems more ready than last time, though the details of the plan remain vague and for the most part unknown. If we consider that EU diplomats are confident that Trump’s behaviour is just a facade and he is actually ready to negotiate, if not even come together against China, the economic front-line seems more promising than the defence one. However, nothing is set in stone and only time will tell.


A CHANGE IN DIET (AT LEAST ACCORDING TO MACRON)


Given this scenario, Macron’s call for the European Union to become an “omnivore” seems coherent with the climate: Brussels should be able to stand on its own feet and show its teeth if necessary, and in this case, even when friends turn to foes.
Mr. Macron is known to be quite a personality, but his comment arrives as Kaja Kallas becomes the new High Representative/Vice President of the European External Action Service, almost potentially fulfilling this request. It is too early to say if Kallas will meet the expectations, but she surely walks through the door with quite an experience and seemingly solid attitudes towards the ongoing crises, building expectations for the upcoming challenges.
She has kept a strong and clear position towards Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, and she will probably push for an increase in military and political support for Ukraine. We could say she puts the money where her mouth is since during her term at the Estonian Parliament she intensified the efforts to make sure sanctions against Russia couldn’t be avoided, to the point where an agreement was reached to use Russia’s frozen assets to pay Ukraine’s war damages back.

So, despite defence being a national competence and the European Defence Industry Strategy still remaining in the member states’ hands and production capacities, a clear stance and a strong personality in the HR/VP office could benefit immensely, boosting the member states to find a compromise to fill the potential void created by the U.S.
When it comes to tariffs, a re-evaluation might take place. Kallas has always had a tough stance on China; however the war in Ukraine and the U.S's potential tariffs both changed the approach towards the country. It might be ideal to soften up the attitudes towards Beijing, especially given its close relations with Russia. However, that doesn’t mean Brussels should drop its guard: eventually EU diplomats should try to juggle with both the east and the west looking for a feasible compromise.


Useful links:

https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/762-what-future-for-european-defence

https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-europe-trade-war-united-states-china-tariffs/

https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-france-europe-us-elections-donald-trump/

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf

https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en

https://www.nzz.ch/english/eu-foreign-affairs-can-kallas-succeed-where-borrell-has-failed-ld.1842687

https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-plan-war-ready-complex-european-defence-industrial-strategy/

https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-donald-trump-trade-war-second-presidency-kamala-harris/

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