HIKMA SUMMIT
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 

WATER

The Jordan River has been at the centre of disputes for decades now, especially given its course: Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Palestine and Jordan are all part of its flow which is approximately 228km long. This river then sees some affluents: the Dan River in Israel, the Hasbani River in Lebanon and the Banias River in the occupied Syrian Golan Highlands. The Yarmouk River, which draws the Jordan-Syria border also joins the Jordan River after Lake Tiberias and before flowing into the Dead Sea.
The inflow into Lake Tiberias has not changed significantly over the years, however the outflown into Jordan dropped significantly due to the diversion of the water into Israel through the National Water Carrier Project*. Moreover, to improve the quality of the water, salinity sources of Lake Tiberias have been transferred into the Jordan River. This practice significantly alters its salinity; a consequence which also reflects in the salinisation of groundwater sources.
Despite this initial picture, liberal institutionalist claim that transboundary water cooperation falls within the category of actions which foster trust, build peace through interdependence and promote conflict resolution. This could be true, if you do not consider agreements signed from unbalanced power-positions, as well as asymmetries and hydro-hegemony. Therefore, normalisation treaties on transboundary resources most often reproduce existing inequalities; most notably in this case:  the Israelo-Palestinian’s.
Water and electricity costs constitute roughly a quarter of Jordan’s public debt, reflecting the country’s long-standing struggle over resource access. From the 1994 Wadi Araba agreement to the most recent fall of Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, Israel has consolidated control over much of the water flowing into the Jordan and Yarmouk basins. This has significantly constrained Jordan’s access to water and limited its ability to independently manage its resources.
Israel’s control and access over Palestinian water resources impact water diplomacy and factual equitable cooperation. This “normalisation” through resource cooperation most likely provokes reactions in the population, so countries dealing with Israel must balance internal and external pressure.
Moreover, over the years Israel has inequitably exploited the Yarmouk River and prevented Jordan from building the Wehda Dam. After the normalisation of relations through the Wadi Araba Treaty and the construction of the Israeli Adassiyeh Dam, Jordan saw a significant drop in water access (from 125 million cubic meter up until 1999, to 71.5 million cubic meters from 1999 to 2018), and the consolidation of Israeli hegemony over shared water resources.

This situation pushed Jordan to find alternatives, such as the Aqaba-Amman Water Desalination and Conveyance Project, which will most likely see the financial support of some European countries and individual US states. The plan primarily entails using renewable energy to make desalinators work and then distribute water nationally. Ideally this will provide a third of the country’s water supply by 2030, yet it doesn’t significantly change the reliance on foreign investments.

ENERGY: DEPENDENCY REPRODUCED

Jordan’s energy sector reflects similar patterns of dependency. Historically, Jordan relied on Arab States, mainly Saudi Arabia. After the first Gulf War the supply came from Iraq, up until 2003. The instability of the region forced Jordan to push the National Electric Power Company into a severe deficit to compensate the imports.
In 2016 Jordan signed an undisclosed purchase treaty with Israel to supply the Kingdom with natural gas coming from the Leviathan Gas Field. This deal was highly controversial domestically. Many Jordanians viewed it as reinforcing dependency on Israel and perpetuating what they see as a broader pattern of political and economic subordination., the lesson of not relying on just one partner does not seem to be learnt, especially given the volatile peace in the area.
Therefore, when temporary supply cuts occur, Jordan must rely on institutions like the IMF without really questioning the over-dependence problem. So, even if Jordan has the capacity to become more independent through recent gas discoveries and solar energy, current policies force the country to remain tied to external support.

ENERGY FOR WATER?

Both resources were dealt with in 2021, when the United Arab Emirates, Israel and Jordan signed a landmark deal which in short would entail the exchange of energy for water: renewable energy would be produced in Jordan to be exported into Israel in exchange for 200 million cubic meters of treated desalinated water.
While framed as mutually beneficial, the agreement sparked strong domestic opposition. A key criticism was the exclusion of Palestinians, arguably the most affected stakeholders, from negotiations. Many Jordanians viewed the deal as undermining Palestinian rights and legitimizing unequal resource distribution. Given this situation, it is difficult to justify the cooperation with Israel.
This highlights a broader issue: agreements that ignore political and legal realities, particularly the occupation and resource inequalities faced by Palestinians, risk deepening tensions rather than resolving them. In such a context, normalization becomes difficult to justify, especially when it appears to reinforce existing injustices.

STABILITY, BUT AT WHAT COST?

Jordan’s position remains contradictory. On one hand, the government publicly supports a two-state solution and Palestinian self-determination. On the other, its normalization agreements with Israel suggest a pragmatic, if controversial, approach driven by economic necessity and resource scarcity.

However, these agreements come at a cost. They contribute to rising public debt, reinforce dependency, and erode public trust in institutions. Moreover, they often prioritize Israel’s strategic and security interests over equitable resource sharing.

Ultimately, while normalization may provide short-term stability, it risks entrenching long-term inequalities, both economically and politically. Without addressing underlying power imbalances and including all stakeholders, particularly Palestinians, such cooperation is unlikely to produce sustainable or just outcomes.

*The NWC was developed in the 50’s and was designed to distribute water equally even in the most arid parts of the country.