Oman: the invisible mediator of a regional chaos

di SIMONE BELLETTI
9 aprile 2026
“To pick a side is always wiser than trying to be neutral”, as Nicolò Machiavelli once said in “The Prince” (1513), referring to those that prefer to stay aside from disputes thinking they would rather benefit from it. Accordingly, in the previous centuries, neutrality was seen as an act of cowardice, but the paradigm seems to have changed in the contemporary era, as neutrality is regarded as a wise geopolitical asset.
This article offers a well-rounded vision of the Oman’s strategy of neutrality applied to critical crises involving its neighbouring countries and the international actors that exert a direct influence in the Middle East: it will specifically try to compare advantages and drawbacks of Oman’s longstanding foreign policy techniques, commonly used to safeguard a general balance of power.
Oman’s free-rider global neutrality
Occupying the easternmost point of the Arabian peninsula, the Sultanate of Oman is historically known to have maintained a general posture of neutrality in the region, thus commonly being referred to as the most credible mediator between conflicting countries. Thanks to a foreign policy of compromise, along with a general interest to prioritize its internal affairs, Oman has barely ever supremacy or control over the Middle East, considering it useless for the prosperity of its economy and deleterious for the maintenance of the social order. By constantly implementing soft diplomacy measures, Muscat has often been able to establish common platforms of dialogue during wartime, mostly offering a and the opportunity to negotiate conciliating resolutions.
Under the international law, the legitimate use of force is only tolerated when implemented to defend from a direct menace, but several international powers often overcome that rule: in some ways, Muscat seems to be the key actor to prevent from continuous escalations in wars, acting as a last (but meaningful) resource to choose compromise over the unjustified use of force.
Under those conditions, international actors like the United States, Iran and Yemen Houthis have barely ever questioned what some analysts call “selfish autoconservativeness”: scholars believe that this posture is accepted because powers look favourably to further strengthen their relations with a country that is able to mitigate conflict effects. Moreover, it is also true that, sometimes, conflicting international actors do not seem prone to lower the intensity of their aggressiveness over an enemy country, but Oman has demonstrated its ability to offer them a fruitful reason to step back, when necessary.
In relation to this, Muscat is well known for having avoided internal tensions through mediation aimed at stabilizing international conflicts: to better explain, the Sultanate has demonstrated a large to compromise, which permits it to project outwards the effects of any economic or socio-political frustration that could menace the country’s internal stability.
In international relations theory, this posture is called “niche diplomacy”, meaning a foreign policy technique that allows less influential countries to invest minimal resources in order to maximize their influence and visibility among bigger powers. This opportunity is mostly conceded to neutral countries, such as Oman or Switzerland, whose final hidden purpose is to become a non-declared buffer zone where to find a safe lodge that offers mediation grounds for peace prospects.
As of 2026, as the world is facing a new era of international conflicts, it appears coherent to ask one question: can Oman remain neutral indefinitely?
While Muscat skillfully navigates through interests of various parties, mainly in order to avoid dependency on a single power, numerous tensions are increasingly threatening the Sultanate’s balance of power techniques.
Eastern Yemen escalations and threats over the strait of Bab al-Mandab.
Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2014, Yemen is seen as a battlefield of international relations that offers (as of now) no possibility of mediation or permanent ceasefire to stop the humanitarian crisis ongoing inside the country. By further delving into the analysis, international actors have been living under a condition of uncertainty concerning the administration of resource flows concentrated in the region: this happens because the Houthis, an armed militia who are currently fighting the civil war, has incessantly threatened to block the passage of crucial resources through the Strait of Bab al-Mandad, one of the most trafficked choke points on Earth.
Furthermore, considering the geographical proximity of Yemen, the Omani government lives a constant constraint for a possible Houthi's land invasion could end Muscat's neutrality in the region: accordingly, it is evident to believe that, if attacked, Oman would have to respond to any kind of armed aggression on its territory. This scenario could come from the Al-Mahra governorate, which is the easternmost region of Yemen, bordering Oman, through which land forces could invade the Sultanate’s land: the final purpose could be reaching the Strait of Hormuz, another fundamental choke point located in the Middle East. What preoccupies Muscat for most is the possibility of a massive migration of Yemenis in Oman: refugees from Sana’a would plausibly look for a safe place where to escape from precarity and life-threatening conditions; because of this, even if the Sultanate could host them for a brief period of time, waiting (and hoping) for the situation to restabilize, their integration in the social relations of Oman would plausibly be really complex, thus exposing the country to weaken its longstanding internal stability.
The last hope to mitigate uncontrolled hate: Oman between Iran and Israel
Farea Al-Muslimi, a researcher from Chatham House, describes Oman's current international engagement as part of a “fragile geometry of neutrality”, referring to the general concern of a possible unintentional involvement of the country in conflicts that do not fit with its external posture of neutrality. Maybe Muscat won’t be able to always detach from Middle Eastern conflicts, but no-one can precisely predict it: what appears more credible is that the current geopolitical situation offers no longer valid perceptions of long-term stability and peace in the region, mostly due to the ongoing conflict between Iran and the US-Israeli forces, erupted in February 2026.
The BBC stresses that Oman keeps on urging for “intensifying efforts” in looking for an agreement that could guarantee a permanent ceasefire in Iran: while some analysts could argue that those “words of soft diplomacy” pose no concrete and practical solution to the conflict, it is also interesting to observe that this precise approach has permitted Muscat to prevent irreversible escalations over the last decades. It appears also relevant to examine the advantages and drawbacks of maintaining a general posture of “niche diplomacy” in really complicated international situations: this geopolitical asset allows Oman to maintain peaceful and fruitful relations with both Iran and the US-Israel coalition, but this general behaviour seems to make the Sultanate forget the risks of never directly supporting one of the counterparts.
While remembering that, during wartime, there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a “success”, staying neutral exposes to two plausible scenarios, crystallized by the Machiavelli’s doctrine of the “war paradox”: if Teheran is successful, then Muscat will have lost the opportunity to establish a strong tie with a proximate power that controls Hormuz; on the contrary, if Washington is successful, then Muscat will have few grounds to benefit from such a big power’s influence over global affairs.
Considering everything stated so far, is it plausible to believe that Oman will permanently maintain an international posture of neutrality?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dall’Asta, Lucia. 2025. “Oman’s Neutrality Under Pressure: Al‑Mahra as the New Test for Muscat’s Diplomacy.” ISPI, 27 November 2025. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/omans-neutrality-under-pressure-al-mahra-as-the-new-test-for-muscats-diplomacy-224253
Lozovan, Corina. 2026. “The View from Muscat: Oman’s Quest for Neutrality amid War in the Middle East.” Middle East Institute Switzerland, 5 April 2026. https://meiswitzerland.ch/themes/geopolitics-global-security/the-view-from-muscat-omans-quest-for-neutrality-amid-war-in-the-middle-east
Lozovan, Corina. 2026. “Oman Positions Itself as Regional Hub through US Strategic Dialogue.” The Arab Weekly, 28 January 2026. https://www.thearabweekly.com/oman-positions-itself-regional-hub-through-us-strategic-dialogue
Lozovan, Corina. 2026. “How Oman Mediates in U.S.-Iran Talks.” NPR, 27 February 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/02/27/nx-s1-5727719/how-oman-mediates-in-u-s-iran-talks
Lozovan, Corina. 2026. “Oman, Eastern Yemen, and the Fragile Geometry of Neutrality.” Chatham House, 6 January 2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/oman-eastern-yemen-and-fragile-geometry-neutrality
BBC News. 2026. “US and Iran Agree to Hold Nuclear Talks in Oman on Friday.” BBC News, early 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy410dq4gvno
MDPI. 2024. “Societies 14 (9): 511.” MDPI Open Access Journal, 2024. https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/14/9/511
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